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THE NEED FOP CONSTITUTIONAL REFopm-A ProGRAux ros NATIONAL SECUnITY. By
'William Yandell Elliott. New York: 1935. Pp. x, 286. Index.
"THE whole of this volume," Professor Elliott writes, "is dedicated to the proposi-
tion that politics and economics are inseparably interlinked" (p. 10). The funda-
mental question which it poses is this: How can we obtain such degree of govern-
mental intervention in the economic order as is today requisite to remedy its
defects as a self-adjusting system, and at the same time remain democratic politically?
This question resolves itself into two questions: First, what shapes should govern-
mental intervention in the economic order take; secondly, what reforms in our con-
stitutional system, harmonious with political democracy, are required to give such
intervention a fair chance of success?
For government to attempt to take over the direct management of business
would, Professor Elliott warns, bring about a fascist revolution. "Where," he
asserts, "the challenge of absolutism has been thrown down and the state has
assumed all power, the result is to precipitate a struggle in which the possessing
classes either perish or take over the new state... .The moral for constitutional
democracies is not difficult to draw. Democracy, today, must not make a frontal
attack on all property rights unless it wishes to sign its own death warrant
Democracy must leave a place for talents and unusual rewards or perish" (pp. 77-78).
State intervention should, therefore, he contends. "be indirect, through the con-
trol of the fiscal, credit, and banking systems. Government control of industry
should be limited to setting the social conditions of all industry and to a type of
holding-company control through officially appointed directors on the boards of the
utility system and of the great extractive and natural resource industries" (pp. 88-89).
Those who are hostile to the New Deal will hardly find much consolation in these
pages. And indeed, while censuring certain of its aspects-especially the impossible
scope of the NIRA-Professor Elliott gives most of the Administration's legislative
program his endorsement so far as its economic assumptions are concerned. It is
on the side of governmental technique that he is critical. "The budget is at the
mercy of subsequent legislative log-rolling ... the executive has only one hold over
his party majority in Congress-patronage." "The New Deal suffers, and must
continue to suffer from being forced to do sleight-of-hand tricks with the old deck"
(pp. 27-28).
Hence arises the problem to which this book is more particularly addressed-that of
constitutional reform, or as the author phrases it, of providing "a workable govern-
ment for our democracy." Interestingly enough, all of Professor Elliott's proposals
in this connection are structural. Writing before the decision in the Schechter Case,
he apparently assumes that the National Government already possesses ample pover
to do what he would like it to do. Nor would he dispense with either the federal
system or judicial review-the latter being, he contends, the inevitable corollary
of the former (p. 179).
His chief proposals look to reconstituting the organization of the national legisla-
tive power so as to minimize the evils, above mentioned, namely, log-rolling and
dependence on patronage. He would supersede the states, both as units of th-
federal system and of representation in Congress, with a baker's dozen of regions
corresponding roughly to the existing Federal Reserve districts; and he would com-
pensate the President for the diminution of power he would suffer if he lost his
patronage by giving him the right once during his term of office to dissolve the
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House of Representatives, which would be elected for four years. Also, in order
to facilitate commercial agreements, he would have treaties ratified by ordinary
legislative process, instead of with the consent of two-thirds of the Senate.
None of these proposals seems to me to be very well considered, I must confess.
What, for instance, would happen to the President once he had shot his bolt?
And for that matter, he has one dissolution under present arrangements--willy nilly
and by the calendar. Then as to the second proposal-would constitutionally
stereotyped regions furnish a more representative Congress (even with proportional
representation) than one the members of which are free, as at present, to combine
and recombine as shifting "regional" interests may dictate? It seems to me that what
we need today is not a more rigid geographical federalism, but an administrative,
functional federalism, the first step to which must be increased centralization. The
third proposal, regarding ratification of treaties, is not needed so far as commercial
arrangements are concerned, as Secretary Hull's present activities, which are based
on Congressional authorization, demonstrate.
But while one may disagree with some of the solutions proposed in this volume,
one can only applaud the lucidity with which it poses its main problem and the
penetration and wit of its many collateral comments. Furthermore, it is a most
timely book-rather more timely indeed, than the author could have foreseen. In
the Schechter Case the Court went on strike in the business of adapting the Con-
stitution "to the various crises of human affairs"-a duty which Marshall regarded
as the first corollary of the power of judicial review. Apparently therefore resort
must be had to the amending power before a constitutional outlet can be provided
for powerful political forces. But if this is so, why stop at particular constitutional
amendments-why not face the problem set by Professor Elliott, of rendering the
structure of our government adequate to the stresses and strains of the new duties
that press upon it? This is the question which shines, sometimes waveringly,
through the varied facets of Professor Elliott's brilliant pages.
EDWARD S. CORWINf
Princeton University
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN NEw YORK STATE.
1934. LEGIsLATIvE DOCUMENT No. 50, ALBANY, N. Y. 1016 PP.
THIs monumental report is one of the most significant contributions to the litera-
ture relating to judicial administration which has appeared in the United States since
the time of David Dudley Field. New York furnished the model for the system of
judicial procedure now in operation in a majority of the states of the Union. Its
efforts to improve that system have been watched with interest in every American
jurisdiction, and its reforms have frequently been followed. As the official report
of a New York state commission, this document could hardly fail to exert an in-
portant influence throughout the United States.
The personnel of the commission lends weight to its discussions and its recom-
mendations. It is widely representative. The state senate and the state assembly
each appointed three of its members to serve on the commission, four members of
the legislature became members ex officio, the New York State Bar Association ap-
pointed four members and the governor of the state appointed six. Furthermore, the
individual members were obviously selected for their knowledge of and their interest
in the problems of judicial administration; and the breadth and thoroughness with
which they carried out their investigations, resulting in proposals for reform of
a most practical and effective type, amply justify the choices which were made.
-Professor of Political Science.
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The range of subjects covered in this report is very large. They may be divided
into two groups, those dealing with judicial organization and those dealing with
judicial procedure.
I
The chief 'weakness which the Commission found in court organization was the
lack of any directing administrative authority over the judges. The English system
which placed the control of the trial courts in the hands of single judges developed
a tradition of independence among the individual members of the court, which
perhaps caused little inconvenience in the days when calendars were less congested
and when the social and business tempo was slower. But it has seriously impeded
efforts to increase the operating efficiency of the courts in response to modem
demands. Extensive studies which the Commission presents of the business of the
Supreme Court (pp. 71-240), of the Municipal Court of the City of New York
(pp. 683-782), and the City Court of the City of New York (pp. 783-827), show a
huge loss of time and effort resulting from lack of centralized administration. To
find a concrete remedy the Commission made a detailed study of the experience of
other jurisdictions, particularly the cities of Cleveland, Detroit and Chicago, and the
state of Michigan, with an administrative judge at the head of the court (pp. 419-
447), supplementing it with an exhaustive examination of the legal and constitutional
status of the plan for an administrative judge in the Supreme Court of New York
(pp. 453-493). It concludes with the recommendation that greater administrative
control, including power to regulate calendars and assign judges, is essential not only
in the courts of the large cities but also in the courts of general jurisdiction which
operate throughout the state.
The jurisdiction, organization and procedure of fifty-three city courts now estab-
lished in cities outside the City of New York are analyzed in connection with a
proposed draft of a Uniform City Court Act, showing an amazing and confusing
variety in respect to the election, qualification and compensation of judges, the
appointment of court employees, territorial jurisdiction, pecuniary limitations, types
of cases cognizable, manner of commencing actions, pleadings, use of juries, and other
matters (pp. 603-653). This problem of standardizing city courts is an important
one in every state, for such courts have almost everywhere grown up in a completely
haphazard way.
The justice of the peace system was exhaustively studied by the Commission
throughout the entire state (pp. 553-597). It was unfavorably impressed with its
highly decentralized character, with its lack of supervision and control and with
the poor quality of the service rendered. The Commission concluded that it would
be necessary to reorganize the whole system, using the county rather than the town
as a territorial basis. In New York, as in most states, such a reorganization would
require a constitutional amendment, and the Commission recommended the complete
elimination from the state constitution of every reference to the justice of the peace,
in order to dear the way for an adequate system of courts of small jurisdiction in
the rural areas. Pending such constitutional revision the Commission contents itself
with a few minor recommendations to ameliorate some of the more easily curable
defects.
As administrative methods of increasing the efficiency of courts of smaller juris-
diction, particularly in cities, various expedients were investigated by the Commission,
such as "small claims" divisions, conciliation, and especially arbitration as a pro-
ceeding supplementary to ordinary litigation. This last plan has had a very inter-
esting development in the Municipal Court of New York, under the initiation and
direction of justice Sweeder, of Brooklyn. It utilizes the services of members of the
bar who volunteer to act as arbitrators without compensation (p. 743). There would
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seem to be great possibilities in the employment of arbitration proceedings of this
type, not only in small cases but in those falling within the jurisdiction of the higher
trial courts.
The problem of jury trials runs through all the special studies of particular courts
pursued by the Commission. They are not only expensive (see pp. 207-9, 736, 813)
but are prolific causes of delay. "Congestion and delay in jury trials is at present
the most pressing problem facing the Municipal Court. There are several districts
where the wait for jury trial is more than two years" (p. 729). This seems to be due
to the demand for juries by defendants who are endeavoring to postpone the trial
of their cases. The Massachusetts referee system, which has resulted in a great
decrease in jury trials, and indeed in trials of every kind, was carefully studied (p.
210) and was recommended as a means of clearing up the arrears of cases on the
Supreme Court calendars. As a permanent solution of the problem, however, the
Commission recommended the abolition of the right of jury trial in cases involving
less than $250, with suitable penalties where a plaintiff demands a jury on a claim of
more than $250 and recovers a verdict for less (p. 31).
II
In the procedural field, the most striking feature of the Report is the dominating
position assigned to discovery before trial and the use of summary judgments. It
is clear that the Commission was convinced that these devices offered greater promise
for improving the administration of justice than any other proposals which were
being currently advanced. References to the need for remedies of this kind occur
in many connections throughout the Report, and one is surprised to note the fre-
quency with which discovery or summary judgment procedure is suggested as the
true solution for the special problem in hand.
Two special studies deal with this subject. There is, first, a Proposed Revision of
Procedure for Examination before Trial-Discussion, Proposed Statutes and Com-
mentaries (pp. 311-342). This contains a history of examination before trial in
New York, a study of its function in pre-trial procedure, a comparative survey of
the scope and effectiveness of examinations in other jurisdictions, and a detailed
analysis of the proposed new statutes. Practically all of the irritating and useless
limitations upon the remedy which have made it so troublesome and technical
in New York practice are swept away. Depositions are to be available from any
one who knows any facts relevant to the case, whether he is a party or not, and
may be taken for the purpose either of discovery or preserving testimony. They
may be taken on notice without any court order, and the notice may also require
the production of documents or things. Penalties in great variety, appropriate to
the various situations presented, are provided as a means for enforcing obedience to
the notice. One rather serious remnant of the ancient practice, however, has been
retained, namely, the rule that the deposition cannot be used unless the deponent is
dead or unavailable. No reasons are offered for preserving this limitation.
Summary judgments, which are nothing but judgments on discovery by affidavit,
are treated in a special study entitled Statistical Survey of Summary Judgments in
New York, which concludes with recommendations, based on the statistics presented,
for improving this procedure in New York City (pp. 367-418).
Two other special studies deal with problems involved in the processes of litigation.
These are The Collection of Money Judgments (pp. 343-366), and Report and
Recommendations on Perjury (pp. 829-847). The first is an excellent analysis of
the weaknesses in the present system of executions and attachments, as well as in
supplementary proceedings, and contains suggestions for making these remedies more
effective. These proposals are not, however, put forward with the recommendation
of the Commission, but only to indicate possible methods of relief. The second
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study proposes to make punishment for perjury a more useful deterrent by removing
the condition that the false testimony, in order to constitute perjury, must be
material to the inquiry, and by making the punishment less severe. These changes
are given the approval of the Commission.
Aside from the foregoing detailed studies, the Commission offers an imposing
list of recommended changes in practice, procedure and evidence, dealing with such
subjects as service of process, survival of actions, limitations, joinder of causes of
action, contribution among tort feasors, pleadings, bills of particulars, consolidation
of actions, joint trials, settlement of issues, various features of trial by jury, wit-
nesses appointed by the court, opinion evidence, exceptions, appeals from inter-
mediate orders, supplementary proceedings, provisional remedies, simplifying mort-
gage foreclosures. These recommendations, with comments, occupy seventy pages
(pp. 241-310).
IM
A third general subject, to which the Commission gives a great deal of attention
throughout its Report, may perhaps be described as ancillary to both court organiza-
tions and procedure. This is the subject of judicial statistics.
Repeatedly the Commission points to the paucity of available statistics as the
chief reason for its inability to diagnose the causes of procedural difficulties, or to
propose suitable remedies. The extensive statistical studies which have already been
referred to serve as striking examples of the enormous intricacy of the data which must
be collected and marshalled in order fully to disclose the actual conditions of litiga-
tion and its procedural results. The necessity for completely reorganizing court
records as a foundation for any sort of adequate statistical presentation of the work
of the courts is clearly brought out.
The solution of the problem of statistics cannot be sought, however, by a tem-
porary commission. Long and patient experimentation will be necessary, and this
can be carried out only by agencies charged with the duty of making continuous
studies of court operations. Such agencies are the administrative judges so strongly
urged for all courts and the Judicial Council, which is already in active operation
in New York State, with a liberal appropriation of funds, as a result of the recom-
mendation of the Commission. No Council has begun its work under more favorable
auspices, and it may well happen that this one agency may be the means whereby
the other reforms proposed by the Commission will eventually be realized.
EDsoN R. SuNER.mAj-
University of Michigan Law School
STUDY oF T BusINEss oF THE FEDERAL COURTS. American Law Institute, 1934.
2 vols. in one. pp. 370, with appendices.
President Hoover's National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement
among its many accomplishments inaugurated this study of the work of the federal
courts. The actual investigation has been carried on through a committee aided by
the collaboration of several law schools, with financial support from the Rockefeller
Foundation. It has, however, been under the supervision of the American Law
Institute, beneath whose imprimatur the study has been published.
The study, it will be observed at the outset, comprises, almost exclusively, original
research of authentic records. It is original, not only in the sources used, but in
its field and technique as well.
tProfessor of Law.
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The field is fairly indicated by its title. Part I, dealing with the criminal side,
covers principally such topics as the classification of defendants by the crime involved;
the disposition of criminal cases; use of indictments and informations; the use of
pleadings, including motions; trials, both by court and jury, their duration and
results; as well as sentences and changes therein. Part II, dealing with the civil
side, covers such studies as the relative volume of federal business, classified on
jurisdictional grounds; jurisdictional objections; methods of disposition; duration
of litigation; the successful party and money recoveries; appeals and their results;
cases removed and three-judge cases. Excellent material on methodology, sources
and aims is also included.
The technique throughout is statistical, a wealth of charts and tables being grouped
under the numerous headings, frequently interspersed with tentative interpretations
by the Committee in charge. Because of this technique, I must confess to a bias
in writing this review. I never did like statistics. Not only do they have an un-
comfortable habit of upsetting one's pet theories, but they deal with unexpected items,
simply incommensurable with the qualities of human nature, which latter are after all
the raw materials of the judicial industry. Consider, for instance, the chart on
Page 41 showing several types of crimes under a caption, "E~fieiency as Shown by
the Extent to Which the Percentage of Cases Disposed of Exceeds the Percentage
of Time Devoted to Them." With the prisoners,-the bootlegger, dope peddler and
auto thief,--before the bar, the statistical eye coldly watches the clock, recording
with irritating precision just how long it takes each unfortunate to get his come-
uppance. And see the text on Page 77: "We next compare the results obtained by
jury trial, using convictions as the criterion of efficiency," followed by the observation
that "The comparatively higher percentages of convictions after the court trials does
not necessarily prove greater efficiency." Thank God for that concessioni Appar-
ently it still is true that on his own judgment day the batting average of the judge
will be reckoned not solely on the number of his convictions.
But to return from this confession of bias to the task in hand. In point of territory,
the study covers the output of the federal courts in thirteen (out of a total of eighty-
four) districts, scattered from Massachusetts to California. Some of the districts
covered are comparatively rural, but among them is the metropolis comprising the
Southern District of New York. In point of time, the study, at least as reported,
covers only one year, viz., the fiscal year ending June 30, 1930.
Because of its avowedly limited scope, sociologists will be disappointed. For there
is little in the study that will add to the general understanding of the crime problem,
penology, probation and parole, etc. Nor will" its contents bring aid and comfort to
judges and lawyers who must perforce wrestle with their daily problems using the
tools at hand. Its chief beneficiaries, I think, will be those who consider themselves
to be enlightened legislators. They will find here considerable factual material upon
which to propose or oppose procedural changes in the federal system.
But even my imaginary legislator will be disappointed if in this study he expects
to find a neat set of ready-made conclusions conveniently arranged to perfect human
justice when touched by the magic of the legislative wand. For the study is essen-
tially statistical, and, as is stated in the introduction, if its results are to have utility,
they must first be interpreted in the light of "facts of a non-statistical nature, either
assumed as common knowledge or derived from sources other than the records."
And after interpretation, the figures can be applied to any particular problem only
by the exercise of an independent judgment. Thus, after all, the figures, standing
alone, can settle nothing; themselves indisputable, they necessarily will provoke
dispute.
To illustrate: In the foreword (October 1934) by Mr. Wickersham, as Chairman of
the Law Observance Committee, it is suggested "that with the repeal of the Eighteenth
BOOK REVIEWS
Amendment and the removal of the great volume of criminal and civil cases depend-
ing upon it, those courts [the federal] should experience no further difficulty, at
least for the time being, in promptly dispatching their business with the preent
judicial force." And today, October 1935, comes the report of the Judicial Con-
ference, wherein the Chief Justice quotes the Attorney General as stating that
"contrary to expectation, the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment has not resulted
in lifting appreciably any burden resting on the federal courts. In the place of
,'prohibition cases', the dockets contain a large number of cases involving violation
of the liquor revenue laws." (With which I respectfully concur!)
Again, Mr. Wickersham in his foreword says: "The reports further suggest an
inadequate basis for much of the vocal opposition to the federal jurisdiction expressed
in Congress, as well as for much legislation proposed and some enacted affecting the
jurisdiction of those courts." In the introduction, separated from this foreword by
only a page of text, appears a reference to an article, (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 499,
by the Chairman of this very Study wherein he seems to advocate the curtailment
of federal jurisdiction on the ground of diversity of citizenship.
With the giants of the intellectual world thus reaching contrary conclusions, our
legislator who seeks to utilize this Study, will, indeed, need to watch his step.
Nevertheless, after discounting the dangers of interpretation and attempting to
discount any personal bias resulting from my close association with the work of the
federal courts, it appears to me that the statistics here published explode the popular
fallacy that the federal criminal system is a jumble of technical, procrastinating,
irrational and cumbersome factors. On the contrary, they support the conclusion
expressed in the introduction that the federal administration of justice on the criminal
side presents a "spectacle of a long line of orderly offenders, few of whom it is neces-
sary to commit to jail, pleading guilty with systematic regularity because reasonably
accurate estimates of the sentence seem possible; raising few technical objections,
and so far the records show, rarely complaining about invasions of their consti-
tutional or other privileges. The proceedings are so expeditious, non-technical, and
uncontested that it becomes important to find where the selective process which
produces such results occurs."
The only quarrel that I have with such a summary is that it assumes the existence
of a "selective process." The text indicates that the selective process consists largely
in what it calls "the guilty plea technique,"-a bit of artificial terminology implying
that the use of the guilty plea, though not necessarily improperly, has been deliberately
fostered by the courts. That the plea of guilty is becoming increasingly "popular"
is amply proved by this study. But that its use is a piece of conscious or deliberate
technique, in my judgment at least, is not at all indicated by the published tables
and, within the limits of my personal observation, is contrary to the fact.
The Study, to be sure, shows many tables in which the results attending a guilty
plea are contrasted with those attending a not guilty plea. For instance, it is shown
that sentences following convictions after trial are heavier than those imposed upon
a plea of guilty. But does this fairly indicate that the prosecuting attorneys are
"inducing," or that judges are bludgeoning defendants to plead guilty? Not at all.
It means only that there is a tendency, human nature being what it is, for the petty
offender to plead guilty and be done with it, and for the vicious criminal to insist
upon trial on the theory that his predicament is so bad that even a trial cannot make
it worse.
The Part devoted to civil business includes much useful information. The break-
down of the federal business into the various jurisdictional grounds is especially
noteworthy. Unfortunately, the civil Part also justifies the candid admission con-
tained in the introduction that much of the material assembled turns out to be of
little present significance. That, of course, is no fault of the Committee. Explorers
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in the desert must not be disheartened if they encounter sand. Even the desert
responds to irrigation and cultivation. And so it may well develop that figures now
apparently lifeless-even to a statistician-will acquire vitality and charm with the
perspective of time.
Right here, I think, lies the greatest achievement of this Study. Quite apart from
the present value of its results, it has proven so successful in the demonstration of
its technique that the Department of Justice has adopted its methods. Already
such data as were assembled for the Study only with great labor are flowing to
Washington as a matter of routine.
In the future, the tables shaped by the Study, extended by an official agency to
national proportions and continued over the years, will doubtless acquire increasing
utility. It is to be hoped, however, that although fascinated with figures we shall
not forget that the science of Judicial Administration is but the servant of Justice;
while Administration may worry about figures and "cases," for Justice the ultimate
object of solicitude is the human being.
CARROLL C. HINCKSt
New Haven, Conn.
REGULATION OF THE SmALL LOAN BUSINESs. By Louis N. Robinson and Rolf Nugent.
New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 1935. pp. 284.
THIs is the final volume of the Small Loan Series sponsored and published by the
Russell Sage Foundation, which during the past quarter century has taken a leading
part in procuring remedial legislation affecting the business of lending small sums.
It is not only in the nature of a summary of previous publications of the series,
prepared under the direction of one of the authors, but is also an independent and
original study of a mass of material gathered by them. It deals only with the small
loan business as defined in the Uniform Small Loan Law, i. e., "a business whose
loans have always been confined to small sums," $300 or less, loaned "chiefly to
wage-earners for consumptive purposes" upon the security of "chattel mortgages on
household furniture, assignments of wages, or simple promissory notes" (p. 4). It
purports to exclude from the area of the study, as does the Uniform Act, "other types
of agencies which lend small sums to wage-earners for consumptive purposes," such
as "pawnbrokers, credit unions, Morris Plan companies and their competitors, and
commercial banks" (p. 4).
The authors have thus tried to confine their study to the small loan business as
defined quite fortuitously in the Uniform Act and its predecessors. It is unfortunate
that they have seen fit to perpetuate this conventional and accidental demarcation,
for no really complete picture of the problems involved in supplying the needs of
necessitous borrowers and of the soundness and reasonableness of the rate limitations
embodied in statutes can be either properly drawn or fully appreciated without
including therein the very matter which the authors have vainly sought to exclude.
Despite their avowed efforts to. "limit the immediate area of this study," they could
not avoid some considerable but incomplete discussion of the very lending institu-
tions not covered the Act (pp. 89-94, 149-157). A departure from the conventional
mode of dealing with this subject might have made their study much more valuable,
There was ample precedent for such inclusive treatment in the legislation enacted in
Arizona and Massachusetts (Ariz. Laws, 1919, ch. 91; Mass. Gen. Laws, 1932, ch.
140, § 96).
Other than in the foregoing respect the book is fairly comprehensive in scope.
In an effort "to review very briefly the history of lending and the development of
tJudge, Federal District Court for Connecticut.
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the restraints which society has imposed upon it" (p. 13), the authors start as far
back as "lending in primitive societies" (pp. 13-15) and follow through to the present
date, including the period of "lending in the United States prior to the Civil War"
(pp. 28-31). As to this last period they state that "Of the 13 original colonies, only
New Hampshire failed to enact special usury laws before the American revolution"
(p. 28). This is inaccurate for on June 7, 1765, the colony of New Hampshire
enacted a law limiting the interest rate to 6% and imposing as a civil penalty for usury
the forfeiture of the debt. (Laws of N. H., Prov. Period 1745-1774, vol. 3, p. 361).
In all substantial respects the New Hampshire law was similar to that of Delaware
(Act of 1752, Laws 1700-1797, S. & J. Adams, p. 96), of Afassachusetts (Act of 1693,
Acts & Laws of Mass. Bay, 1742, p. 38), of New Jersey (Act of 1738, Laws of
N. J., 1702-1776, Allison, p. 110), and of Pennsylvania (Act of 1722, Charters &
Acts of Pa., Peter Miller, large, 1700-1759, p. 89). See also J. B. C. MURA, His-
TORY OF UsuRY (1866) ch. iv. The subject of lending and of interest laws in the
United States prior to the Civil War warranted much fuller treatment.
In the succeeding two chapters the development in modem times of a business
limited to the lending of small sums is very interestingly and carefully traced and
fully documented by exhaustive references to sources hitherto untapped. The evils
of the unregulated lending era are fully set forth, as is also the story of the periodic
campaigns to combat the loan shark. The facts presented lead inevitably to the
conclusion, not clearly articulated by the authors, that in dealing with the problems
involved in lending small sums and protecting necessitous borrowers from being
mulcted, no adequate protection could be assured under general interest or usury
laws, for despite harsh civil and criminal penalties for the taking of usury, the loan
shark still managed to flourish.
In a discussion of the small loan business in relation to general interest laws, the
authors have included a chart purporting to set forth the "legal and maximum con-
tract interest rates, and penalties for excess charges, provided by statutes in effect
in 1932" (pp. 67-69). This chart, though presenting in form very useful informa-
tion, has been very badly and inaccurately prepared. The statement that the civil
penalties for excessive charges in New York is "forfeiture of principal and interest
vnless . .. loan is for $5,000 or vore on. collateral security" is an accurate descrip-
tion of the contents of Section 379 of the General Business Law, which deals solely
with call loans on certain types of security furnished as collateral. The penalty in the
case of loans made by banks is merely forfeiture of interest (N. Y. Bank. Law,
§ 114). The different treatment of various types of loans provided for in the New
York law, as in that of other states, might have been reflected in a properly and
accurately prepared chart. In some portions of the chart it is noted that the laws
of some states permit recovery back after principal and excessive interest have been
paid by the borrower, and in other portions of the chart this information is omitted
(N. Y., GEN. Bus. LAW, § 372).
In tracing the history of the small loan business and the first regulatory laws, the
authors might well have noted the recognition in legislation of the need for pro-
tecting a particular class of borrowers and the carving out of the general usury laws
an exceptional treatment for the benefit of a class defined only after persistent
legislative experimentation. Throughout the past century the trend of legislation
has been to permit greater freedom in contracting for charges on purely business
as distinguished from consumptive loans. The doctrines of economic liberalism were
reflected in the constantly changing interest or usury laws and their relaxation, espe-
cially in the larger commercial states as applied to commercial as distinguished
from consumptive borrowing. [See Cram v. Hendricks, 7 Wend. 569, 654 (N. Y.
1831); J. B. C. MURRAY, HisTORy or UsURy (1866) 90]. This was particularly
noticeable in laws prohibiting corporations from interposing the defense of usury,
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which were generally enacted around the middle of the past century and are still in
force in practically every state, and also in the laws enacted by New York and
Delaware [N. Y., GEN. Bus. LAW, § 379; N. Y., BANK. LAw, § 115; Del, Laws
(1915) ch. 213] removing restrictions on charges for call loans of $5,000 or more
secured by certain kinds of commercial paper, and in the laws enacted by Massachu-
setts, Colorado and New Hampshire, removing any limitations upon interest charges.
During this process of liberalizing the interest laws, legislators gradually recognized
the necessity for exceptional treatment of different kinds of loans and classes of
borrowers, and this had a definite relation to and real effect upon the first regulatory
laws dealing with the loan shark evil and the small loan business.
The chapter dealing with these first regulatory laws (p. 74) is quite inadequate and
inaccurate in some respects. The first New York Act of 1895 (pp. 74-75) is inade-
quately and inaccurately described. It is stated that the law applied to "cities of
more than 300,000 population." It actually applied to cities of more than 300,000
and less than 600,000, thus excluding New York City. The authors do not mention
that within a month after the enactment of this law the exterior limitations mak-
ing it inapplicable to cities of over 600,000 was removed, thus including New York
City in its application (N. Y. Laws, 1895, ch. 706). They fail to discuss the features
and defects of this law or of any of the other small loan laws.
It might have been extremely interesting to have analyzed the distinctive features
of these first regulatory laws and to have traced the changes in the law as a result of
the experience thereunder and to have shown the relationship of these laws to the
first draft of the Uniform Act. The small loan laws of today are the product
of a continuous development in dealing with the problems inherent in the business
of lending small sums. They are the fruit of persistent legislative experimentation,
culminating in the most comprehensive and finished effort in that direction-the
Uniform Act. Their origins are to be found in the various types of early laws
directed at eliminating the loan shark. The successive statutes in many ways are
composite reflections of acute conditions and of the prevailing sociological and
governmental theories for remedying these conditions, and further of the adjust-
ment of conflicting social and economic interests. The period of this growth is so
brief and its evidence so ample and complete as to afford a considerable insight
into the process of the law's origin and development.
In a chapter entitled "Development of the Uniform Small Loan Law" the authors
present a very interesting story of the movement that immediately preceded the
drafting in 1916 of the first Uniform Act. Though they mention the small loan
laws which were enacted prior to the drafting of the Uniform Act and discuss the
forces behind the enactment of these laws, they make no analysis of the provisions
of these laws, nor for that matter of the Uniform Act.
The authors state in a chapter entitled "Small Loan Legislation 1916-1934" that
"when the Uniform Small Loan Law was agreed upon [1916] there were six states
in which fairly satisfactory small loan laws were in force" (p. 118), omitting to
mention the New York Act [N. Y. Laws (1915) ch. 588], the essential features of
which were embodied in the first draft of the Uniform Act.
The authors, in referring to the features of the successive drafts of the Uniform
Act, discuss almost exclusively those relating to the maximum rate allowed. The
Uniform Act had, until the sixth draft was adopted on January 1, 1935, provided
for a rate of 332% per month, or 42% a year. This rate was subjected to frequent
and periodic attacks as excessive, and from about 1929 on the maximum rate was
-reduced by law in many states, despite the objections of the sponsors of the
Uniform Act.
It appears that the maximum rate of 33/2% a month, provided for in the first five
drafts of the Uniform Act, was the result of a compromise effected in 1916 between
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the representatives of the Russell Sage Foundation and those of the American Asso-
ciation of Small Loan Brokers (pp. 115-116). Prior to that time the Foundation
had sponsored lower maximum rates, ranging from 2% to 3% per month. As a
result of the working agreement entered into in 1916 between the reformers and
the lenders, the Foundation was until 1930 committed to the aforesaid compromise
and thereby barred from urging the adoption of a lower rate. Even after this agree-
ment expired in 1930, the Foundation apparently took no active part in the cam-
paigns for downward revision of the maximum rate, until the sixth draft was adopted
on January 1, 1935.
The authors state that "Bills to amend the Uniform Law or its equivalent vere
frequent. The rate of interest was particularly subject to periodic attack" (p.
122). They consider that many of these attacks were "inspired by legislators who
saw political advantage in this gesture, or by high-rate lenders in retaliation for
campaigns against them in other states" (pp. 122-123). No doubt they do not
include in that category Professor John R. Commons, whose proposal that special
fact finding commissions determine and fix reasonable maximum rates has been
adopted in Wisconsin and in some other states, and has been followed by downward
revisions of the maximum rate (pp. 125-127).
The authors devote a lengthy chapter (pp. 243-271) and other portions of the
book to a discussion of the maximum rate, in which they tend to justify the alleged
reasonableness of the 3/2% per month maximum charge, though they disclaim
any such intention. Despite their very elaborate and careful study of this question,
one cannot readily reconcile their insistence that the small loan business cannot be
profitably conducted at a much lower rate with the fact that credit unions, Morris
Plan companies and their competitors and personal loan departments of certain
banks are able to conduct a successful business by discounting lbans at the rate of
8% per year and requiring the repayment in weekly or monthly installments,
under which the rate, even as computed by the authors, amounts to no more than
from 17.7% to 19.5% a year (p. 92). The annual rate is not quite as high under the
plan of the National City Bank of New York. Comparing such rates with 42%
per year authorized as the maximum charge under the Uniform Small Loan Law
(prior to the Sixth Draft of 1935), it is quite difficult to accept the authors' apparent
defense of the maximum rate contained in the Act.
The authors, who had brought their study down to December 1, 1934, append in
two dosing paragraphs the information that on January 1, 1935, the Foundation
approved a draft-the Sixth-of the Uniform Act recommending "as an initial
maximum a rate of 351 per cent a month on that part of any loan not in excess
of $100 and 22 per cent a month on that part in excess of $100" and further
recommended "that the initial maximum rate be reconsidered by each state after
a reasonable period of experience with it" (pp. 270-271). The graduated rate was
not unknown in small loan legislation. (See N. Y., Laws 1913, ch. 579,) long before
that date.
JOSEPH HN.R Y CoHENnt
New York City
CASES AN AUTHORTES ON PUBLIC UTILrES. Second edition. By G. H. Robinson,
Chicago: Callaghen and Co. 1935. pp. xxxvii, 884.
THE first edition of this casebook was enthusiastically received as, among other
things, a good collection of sources and a worthwhile experiment in selection and
tMember of the New York Bar.
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arrangement of materials.' And the industry of the editor displayed in the com-
pilation of usable, suggestive, and almost exhaustive notes to the principal cases was
duly acknowledged and commended.
There is little to add on these points with reference to the new edition. The
general theory and organization of the casebook remains the same, although there has
been considerable rearrangement within the old framework. The cases are all inter-
esting: both the facts and the problems hold the attention. Many of the cases
(83 of the 199 principal cases) are new in this edition and almost all the cases are
modem, a point probably of greater importance in this field than in the common law
subjects. The notes are of the same good quality as in the previous edition and
are up to the minute. 2 The first edition was, and the second edition is, a good
sourcebook and one of the better casebooks. The book is good enough to stand one
complaint and one query.
Apparently no attempt has been made to indicate omissions from the opinions of
the principal cases. In many of them there has been a good deal of excision without
the courtesy of dots or stars. There are several good reasons why the courtesy
should be extended, in addition to the one that careful students (including teachers)
like to know when the reprint is full and when it is partial. Such students similarly
like to be informed of the fact that there is a dissenting or specially concurring
opinion in addition to the court opinion.8 While such excisions from the full reports
may be justified, neither space nor bother justify the absence of the "X marks the
spot."
But what can be the justification for some of the excisions? Is the opinion of
Mr. Justice Roberts in Texas & Pacific Ry. v. United States (p. 251) holding that
ports are not localities within the prohibition of prejudice and preference in Section
3(1) of the Interstate Commerce Act, more enlightening or instructive than the
wholly omitted dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Stone, concurred in by the Chief
Justice and Justices Brandeis and Cardozo? Or more interesting? Or more signi-
ficant or prophetic with respect to the future?4 The wholly omitted dissenting opinion
of Mr. Justice Butler in Los Angeles Gas & Electric Corp. v. R. R. Comm. (p. 399)
throws almost more light on what happened in that case and on the significance of
that decision in judicial rate-making, than does the opinion of the majority. The
dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Frost v. Corporation Comm.5 (p. 103),
1. See reviews by C. E. Clark (1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 339; G. J. Thompson (1927),
40 HARv. L. REv. 517; R. M. Hutchins (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 432.
2. It is difficult to restrain boyish glee at finding what seems to be an oversight In these
excellent compilations, the omission in the note to R. R. Comm. of Cal. v. Los Angeles
Ry. Corp. (p. 499) of R. J. Smith, The Judicial Interpretation of Public Utility Franchises
(1930) 39 YALE L. J. 957, and in the note to Los Angeles Gas & Electric Corp. v. R, R.
Comm. (p. 410) of I. Barnes, Federal Courts and State Regulation of Railroad Rates (1934)
43 YALE L. J. 417. The editor's decision to eliminate from the second edition the bibli.
ography contained at the beginning of the first is regrettable.
3. E. g. Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Seattle is reprinted (p. 110) with no
mention of the specially concurring, neo-dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Van Devanter,
joined in by his colleagues McReynolds, Sutherland and Butler, J. J.; Black & White
Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., (p. 175) with no
mention of the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in which Justices Brandeis and
Stone concurred. Perhaps the omissions of this character were unintended, for In other
cases the dissenting opinions are duly noted.
4. Compare the recommendations of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the
Federal Coordinator of Transportation, noted at page 261.
S. Only eight lines of this typical Brandeis opinion are reprinted, six stating what the
majority held, two stating his conclusion.
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United Rys. & El. Co. v. West6 (p. 449) and St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry. v. United
States7 (p. 455) and those of Mr. Justice Stone in United States v. Chicago, 2L St.
P. & P. R. R.8 (p. 369) and of Mr. Justice Cardozo in Interstate Commerce Coam-
mission v. Oregon-Washington R. & N. CoP (p. 512) are at least as important and
certainly more instructive and more interesting than the respective majority opinions.
The anticipated justification for these and similar omissions raises the query,--a
query as to the theory and organization of the materials. Does not the book attempt
to cover too many diverse topics? Horizontal comprehensiveness in a casebook which
is not made to order for a particular person has obvious advantages. A teacher v:ho
is so minded may concentrate on the liabilities of carriers (by railroad, water, auto-
mobile or air) innkeepers, and "other utilities" for injuries to passengers, guests, other
persons, baggage and other property. Or he may concentrate on "the public utility
concept" and the "legislative authority to declare publicness", whether a taxicab
under particular circumstances is a "common carrier" within the meaning of a clause
in an insurance policy providing for double liability, whether a particular rooming
house is a "hotel" within the meaning of a statute requiring fire escapes on "hotels",
whether the owner of an office building is a "public utility" in operating its elevators
so as to be liable to a tenant injured in an elevator despite a clause in the lease
saving the owner harmless, and so on. Or he may devote his attention exclusively
to the regulation of rates, control of financial operations, regulation of extensions,
additions and abandonments, discrimination in rates between individuals, industries,
localities, intercorporate and holding company situations or competition between pub-
licly and privately owned utilities. But if the horizontal comprehensiveness can be
attained only at the cost of omissions like those mentioned, is not the price too
great?'0
Similarly, the notion of a "public utility concept" with which the book begins
leads to a classification of cases on the basis of various "obligations? of public util-
ities-whether railroads, taxicabs, telephone companies, trucking, gas or water com-
panies and others. But the railroads have had a continuous history of regulation
by one legislature, one commission and one court. A great deal, perhaps too much,
is lost when the railroad cases are scattered, without reference to date and unity of
regulation, among a variety of cases involving different industries, different commis-
sions, different legislatures, different histories and largely different problems. The
same question is raised with respect to the practice of cutting a single opinion in a
single case into several parts and reprinting the parts separately at different places
in the volume. Of course, a single case raises many problems and you cannot talk
about everything at once. The Illinois Bell Telephone caseu has the stuff of a
complete course. But the problems are integral parts of the whole case and can be
better comprehended if examined seriatinm after rather than before the whole has
been seen. One is apt to get a queer impression in coming upon an arm here, a head






10. All of the principal cases in this volume are court opinions. The suggestion that
greater use of decisions of public utility commissions may be desirable was made in a
review of the first edition. See Hutchins, supra note 1. Wntcir, CAsEs o:, PoBraic U rr
RwuLATio (1932) makes extensive use of such decisions, but errs in other respects.
11. Pp. 361, 375, 417 and 433.
fAssociate Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADMINISTRATIV LAW. By Felix Frankfurter and J. For-
rester Davison. Second edition. Chicago: The Foundation Press, Inc. 1935. pp.
XIII, 651.
WHEN the first edition of this casebook was published, a reviewer in this Journal
chided the editors a little for devoting so much space to what he termed "the great
American illusion called 'Separation of Powers' ", and characterized their action as
"the authors' gracious bow to the traditions of their environment."1  But less than
three years later the Supreme Court decided the "Hot Oil" 2 and "Sick Chicken"3 cases
and the superiority of the editor's judgment was amply demonstrated. Separation
and delegation of powers were far from an illusion, but the real axe with which the
Supreme Court decapitated first section 9(c) and then the whole of the NIRA. The
"illusion" became one of the liveliest constitutional problems of our time. That
careful drafting of legislation may avoid the dangers of unconstitutional delegation
and that careful, expert drafting might have avoided, as many assert, at least some
of the rigor of the Panama and Schechter decisions 4 is only additional justification
for the editor's emphasis of the problem. And in any event, since the material is
composed almost entirely of opinions in real cases involving real legislation and real
situations, the criticism is directed more to the chapter headings than to the content.
The present edition is a drastic abridgment of the first. The number of pages
has been cut to almost half. A little over a hundred of the principal cases in the
first edition are omitted in the second. Only fifteen new principal cases have been
added, though all of them are highly important.3 But the organization and emphasis
in both editions are the same. There must have been great need or pressure for
abridgment; otherwise, it is difficult to conceive how the editors could have been so
merciless with their first product.
Administrative law is still virgin territory-at least for casebook editors. Neither
edition of this casebook attempted to exhaust all the problems or all the sources.
Nothing of that nature could be done in this field in less than a score of volumes.
The casebook apparently proceeds upon the unassailable theory that intensive inves-
tigation of "horizontal" or "vertical" problems is a matter for individual research
by students and teachers, that a casebook, at least with this title, can and should
provide only a common base, a common culture with which to start. Both editions
perform that function, though I would prefer the unabridged first with the additions
of the second. The general material in Part I, "Separation of Powers" is worth
emphasis, if for no other reason, because it is "a reminder of the historic continuity
of those issues of statecraft which lie behind the American doctrine of judicial review
and which, from time to time, whenever a particular decision of the Supreme Court
excites a passing intensity of public opinion, are dealt with apart from their geneology
and unrelated to the helpful experience of the past"°-a reminder which may be
particularly appropriate at the present time.
Yale Law School
1. R. J. Smith (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 936-38.
2. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 389 (1935).
3. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U. S., 55 Sup. Ct. 837 (1935).
4. Supra notes 2 and 3.
5. Among the cases added, in addition to the Panama and Schechter cases are
Appalachian Coals Inc. v. U. S., p. 286, Crowell v. Benson, p. 574, Federal Trade Comm. v.
Keppel & Bro. Inc., p. 565, O'Donoghue v. U. S. p. 310, U. S. v. Ill. Central R. R., p. 482.
An extract from the Report of the Committee on Ministers' Powers presented to Parliament
in 1932 takes the place (p. 17) of statements by Calvin Coolidge, Elihu Root and Clyde
B. Aitchison in the earlier edition.
6. See Review, Frankfurter, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 519, 520 (1927).
fAssociate Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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